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Abstract 
Family firm researchers have found a host of characteristics that are unique to family firms. 
These  familial  attributes  are  often  taken  as  plausible  explanations  for  governance  and 
operational differences between family firms and their non-family competitors. We use these 
familial  characteristics  as  well  as  a  host  of  ‘non-family’  specific  provisions  to  build  an 
Investment Reputation Index that measures the reputation of a family firm as an investment 
opportunity. The results of an empirical study of 199 ‘quoted’ family firms supported the 
hypothesis  that  the  investment  reputation  of  a  family  firm  has  a  positive  impact  on  its 
performance.  However,  a  similar  empirical  analysis  using  a  measure  of  the  Investment 
Reputation Index without the familial attributes, showed a stronger impact on performance, 
signifying a negative association with recognizing the familial characteristics of the firm. An 
empirical analysis on a matched sample of 304 family- and non-family firms revealed that the 
investment reputation of a family firm can only be brought into comparable terms with the 
reputation  of  a  non-family  firm  if  the  familial  attributes  are  included  in  the  analysis. 
Understanding ‘How family is the family firm?’ is important from an investor’s point of view 
as it highlights the good practices of some family firms. An investor instead of grouping all 
family firms into one category can now differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ family firms 
with the help of the Investment Reputation Index.  
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 1. Introduction: 
 
Around 76% of the top 8000 firms in the UK are either family owned or controlled with a 
possibility of more family firms in the wider realm of the business population (Gallo, 1994). 
Researchers  have  found  similar  statistics  for  family  firms  around  the  world
1.  The 
predominance of family firms and their impact on the GDP of a country cannot be ignored. 
An  analysis  done  by  Thomson  Financial  for  Newsweek  revealed  that  family  firms  were 
outperforming  their  non-family  competitors  in  six  major  European  countries
2.  They  also 
provide a list of the top 10 fastest growing family firms, which are mainly from Switzerland, 
Germany, France, and Spain. It is interesting to note that all the top family enterprises are 
from economies that do not follow the Anglo-Saxon model even though UK was included in 
the study. However, the study does mention that family firms in the UK do outperform their 
non-family counterparts.  
The  ‘stigma’  associated  with  being  a  family  firm  has  been  highlighted  in  the  past  when 
Rupert Murdoch came under fire for promoting his son to run the publicly traded BSkyB 
satellite network. There are several other instances that have led to a negative association with 
family firms such as the $18 billion loss at Parmalat caused by the Tanzi family in Italy and 
the  Swiss  conglomerates’,  Erb  Group,  collapse  after  the  death  of  its  founder  revealed 
accounting anomalies. These instances are the exceptions rather than the general rule and for 
that matter are not restricted to family firms. The recent cases of Tyco, Enron and Worldcom 
reveal that the faults may lie with the firm rather than the type of ownership. Besides, the 
Thomson Financial study reveals that family firms in Italy outperform the index even taking 
into account the Parmalat fiasco.  
Considering  that  there  has  been  some  positive  research  into  family  firms  and  their 
profitability we actually see very little impact of this on the real world. In the UK family firms 
are not considered as exceptional investment commodities. The negativity associated with the 
governance structure and performance of family firms is clouding their image. Family firms 
are  known  to  suffer  from  nepotism,  a  lack  of  professionalism,  conflicts  between  family 
members, and a lack of adaptability. However they also possess a sense of loyalty, the ability 
to foster entrepreneurial talents, long-term commitments to stakeholders and a pride in their 
family traditions. To support these familial  characteristics  family firms have developed a 
unique structure of governance which varies across family firms.  
                                                      
1 Dreux(1990); Lank (1994); Reidel (1994); Marinez (1994); Owen (1994) 
2 Newsweek article ‘Best of The Best’ published on 12th April, 2005 written by Karen Lowry Miller ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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The  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  (DTI)  produces  annual  statistics  of  Small-  and 
Medium-size enterprises in the UK. In 2003 there were 4 million SME’s in the UK of which 
70.1% were sole-proprietorships or partnerships where the owner-manager was one and the 
same. Given the number of family firms in the UK presented above we may find that some of 
these firms in their willingness to expand will seek investment from outside investors either 
through private equity or placing. Therefore there is increasing need to ensure that the unique 
nature of companies that are run either by their founder(s) or their descendent(s) is properly 
interpreted from an investor’s point of view. 
Thus it opens up the question: How do investors judge these firms? The obvious advantage 
and  disadvantage  of  having  a  strong  family  presence  have  been  presented  above.  These 
features give ‘family firms’ a certain level of uniqueness and sets them apart from their non-
family competitors. Our paper studies the effect of these familial features on the reputation of 
a family firm as an investment opportunity. It is important to understand if these particular 
characteristics of the family firm create a difference for an investor and whether it propagates 
investment reputation differences between family and non-family firms. Section 2 describes 
the theoretical background into the research.  
A thorough reading of the literature review doesn’t provide a consistent definition of a family 
firm. Most researchers seem to use definitions of a family firm to suit their own research. 
Therefore a consensus on the subject is difficult to achieve. The truth of the matter is that 
family firms are complex organizations where we have at least three separate shareholder 
classes- family, managers and ordinary shareholders. This however is the simplest structure. 
Often  we  find  an  organization  where  the  family  itself  is  made  up  of  cousins  and  other 
extended family  members.  The  interpersonal  relationships  and  the  complexities  that arise 
from it pose some concern to researchers. We have used Shanker and Astrachans’ (1996) 
‘Middle’ definition of a family firm to set up certain rules while determining a family firm.  
Section 3 presents the construction and components of the Investment Reputation Index used 
to measure the reputation of a firm as an investment opportunity. The components of the 
Index were compiled from the empirical results of various ‘ownership based performance’ 
literature as well as reputation studies. The purpose of the Index is to assimilate a series of 
provisions that are easily observable and are based on market and accounting figures. This 
eliminates the uncertainty associated with survey based reputation analysis which depends 
heavily on the perceptions of the respondents. We use the methodology in Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003) to build our Index. The Investment Reputation Index can be divided into two ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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thematic groups. We compute it by combining a total of 17 provisions, six of which are the 
familial  attributes  and  the  remaining  11  factors  are  market  or  accounting  figures  that  an 
investor would like to know before investing in a firm for the year 2003. The construction of 
the  index  is  straightforward  with  a  point  awarded  for  each  provision  that  enhances  the 
reputation of a firm as an investment. The firms with the lowest rank are firms with low total 
points on the index and are therefore firms with lower reputation as an investment opportunity 
and vice versa.  
The details of the sample and the empirical investigation into the relationship between the 
Index and performance are provided in Sections 4 & 5. We assemble a sample of 199 family 
firms, mostly run by founder(s) and mainly registered on the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM). The mean age of our family firms is 15 years signifying younger firms in the sample. 
We find that the Investment Reputation Index has a strong positive relation to performance. 
However, when we examine the relationship using the same set of firms but excluding the 
familial  attributes  (thus  looking  at  it  as  just  another  firm)  the  strength  of  the  positive 
association  is  higher.  This  means  that  recognizing  a  firm  as  ‘family’  has  some  negative 
association. We also matched the family firms with a set of 152 non-family firms and an 
Investment Reputation Index for this set of firms was also calculated. The matched sample 
revealed that by measuring both types of firms on the same index, the reputation of a family 
firm is lower. Again suggesting a negative association with being a family concern. However, 
when we take into account the 6 familial attributes for the family firms that add value to its 
reputation we are able to remove the negativity associated with family firms and bring it in 
line with the reputation of a non-family firm. This means by separating the set of firms into 
‘bad’ family firms, ‘good’ family firms, and non-family firms we are able to remove some of 
the stigma associated with family enterprises. 
Our data and methodology draws on empirical work done in the area of governance and 
finance. However, there are certain unique aspects of our research. Traditional family firm 
research concentrates on ‘private family-owned firms’ where as we concentrate on ‘public 
family  firms’.  This  extends  the  debate  between  family  and  non-family  firms  into  the 
investment  arena.  We  believe  that  the  research  and  findings  of  our  paper  brings  to  the 
forefront  the  need  to  distinguish  between  family  firms  on  the  basis  of  their  unique 
characteristics. It highlights indirectly the impact that value-enhancing familial characteristics 
can have on the performance of a family firm. Section 6 summarises and concludes the paper 
with discussions of possible areas of future research.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
Copyright © 2005 Mukherjee and Padgett.    6 
   
 
Section 2: Background  
 
Section 2.1: The benefits and costs associated with a family firm  
 
A number of cases and surveys illustrate the governance and performance problems inherent 
in family-controlled businesses. Shack (2001) talks about how the Ford family were able to 
increase their voting rights in the company (while reducing their total shareholding from 6% 
to 4.5%) using the idea of giving surplus cash back to shareholders through the issue of 
special B class shares.  As they were already the leading shareholders at Ford Motor there was 
little  opposition.  The  family  was  able  to  gain  more  control  at  the  expense  of  minority 
shareholders. Therefore, large family firms with substantial voting rights in the firm are prone 
to expropriate smaller shareholders through excessive compensations and special dividends. 
DeAngelo & DeAngelo (2000) research the Times Mirror Company, a firm listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange and part of the Fortune 500 list. The family’s aspirations to maintain 
their special dividends affected the firm’s capital expansion plans, which in turn   hampered 
the operating and share-price performance of the firm. In 1995 however, by bringing in an 
outside  CEO,  the  company  was  able  to  attain  the  financial  discipline  necessary  for  the 
sustainability of the business. The pressures of paying a dividend to other shareholders finally 
put an end to the 8 years of poor firm performance.  
Binder Hamlyn (1994) report a number of differences between the performance of family and 
non-family firms. They studied 667 private unquoted companies in UK over a period of 6 
years (1988-1993) with sales revenue between £2.5 and £25 million. The study showed that 
the sales growth of non-family firms was four times higher than family firms. They also 
experienced  higher  average  absolute  employment  growth  and  an  increase  in  productivity 
while productivity in family firms was falling
3. 
Barclay & Holderness (1989) present the idea that large shareholders have greater control 
over the company and can use this to extract private benefits that are not available to other 
shareholders. In the event of the purchase of large block holdings a premium is paid for these 
private benefits, this can dissuade potential bidders and reduce firm value. 
Family owners with large shareholdings can have a negative impact on non-family employees 
working in the company. Shleifer & Vishny (1997) suggest that large shareholders insist on 
                                                      
3 As reported in Westhead and Cowling (1997). ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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being active in management even if they are not competent or qualified as compared to a 
professional manager. This gives rise to big losses. Burkart, Gromb, & Panunzi (1997) point 
out  that  when  managers  are  closely  monitored  by  large  shareholders,  they  can  lose  their 
initiative  to  search  for  new  investment  projects,  as  there  is  a  possibility  of  shareholder 
interference. Managers who have full knowledge of the best opportunities for a firm have 
effective control but with monitoring, large shareholders can gain access to this information 
and  block  private,  discretionary  benefits  that  managers  could  otherwise  gain.  Therefore 
concentrated ownership coupled with monitoring can have a negative impact on managerial 
initiative. 
All the above studies suggest that family firms afford a number of disadvantages that a non-
family firm would not experience. Thus, any shareholder knowing this would be discouraged 
from  investing  in  this  unique  enterprise,  a  family  firm.  However,  a  study  performed  by 
Thomson  Financial  into  the  profitability  of  family  businesses  revealed  that  family  firms 
outperformed their non-family counterparts in six European countries. They built a unique 
index  for  family  and  non-family  firms  in  each  European  country,  i.e.  Germany,  France, 
Switzerland, Spain, Italy, and UK, and tracked them over a 10-year period until December 
2003. In Germany, the returns of family firms led by BMW soared 203% compared to the 
paltry growth of 47% for their non-family counterparts. In France too the returns of the family 
firm index soared by 203% compared to 76% for the non-family firms. Daily & Dollinger 
(1992,  1993)  find  that  family  firms  tend  to  be  smaller  and  are  likely  to  outperform 
management controlled non-family firms. Stoy Hayward (1992a) analysed share value and 
found that if £1 was invested in the FT All Share Index in 1970 it would grow to £8.72 by 
1991. However, if £1 was invested in quoted family firms it would have grown to £11.11. 
This contradicts the negative results mentioned before. Stoy Hayward reconcile the two by 
pointing out that if family ownership is retained for a longer period of time the firm may not 
be able to reach it’s full potential in terms of growth and expansion of the business.  
Westhead (2003) points out that the inside knowledge that a family has about their business 
gives them an edge in running their business profitably. Bjuggren & Sund (2001) suggest that 
one of the main reasons for families to pass down the reigns of the business to other family 
members is to ensure that the firm is served by the advantage of using the ‘idiosyncratic 
knowledge’ accumulated over the years. Ang, Cole & Lin (2000) study agency costs in firms 
with different ownership patterns and management structures. They find that agency costs in 
firms that are managed by an outsider as compared to an insider are higher and reduce as ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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management shareholding increases. Most of the smaller family firms are run by their owners 
and as such it stands to reason that family firms will have lower agency costs. 
Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson (1997) present the idea of stewardship theory based on well-
recognised  sociological  and  psychological  theories.  Managers  who  identify  with  their 
business and associate their personal success with that of their firm are natural stewards of the 
firm. They will work to solve organizational problems and take on tasks to fulfil business 
goals. Family firm members who are part of the management have a vested interest in the 
company’s success and will act as stewards to ensure that there is continued success. 
Chami  (1999)  talks  about  the  role  of  trust  and  altruism  in  strengthening  the  relationship 
between family members and thereby serving the family-firm by giving it a competitive edge. 
In  the  presence  of  trust  the  need  for  costly  monitoring  and  performance-related  rewards 
become  redundant  and  boosts  the  efforts  of  family  members  and  management.  Another 
feature in family firms where the family is active in management is ‘guaranteed succession’ 
which induces family members (in particular the child) to put in their best efforts.  
Van den Berghe & Carchon (2003) note how the visions, goals and objectives of a family-run 
business are controlled by the need to pass on wealth to future generations. This altruistic 
nature of a family member to secure the future of another can lead to successful investment 
strategies to ensure the continuous growth of the business. 
Stein (1988, 1989) points out that managers who are worried about shareholder activism and 
takeovers are likely to suffer from ‘managerial myopia’, which ruins the potential for firms to 
take on long-term investments that could provide better returns. The presence of a long-term 
investor, like a family, can help to reduce this myopia and lead to the adoption of good long-
term investment strategies.  
Anderson  et.  al.  (2002)  investigate  the  effects  of  family  ownership  on  the  firm’s  debt 
financing. They found that because of a family firm’s long-term presence they could avail 
themselves of cheaper debt financing in comparison with non-families. The long-term nature 
of founding family ownerships suggest that external bodies like suppliers and providers of 
capital, are more likely to deal with the same governing body and practices for longer periods 
in family firms. Thus, a family’s reputation builds for it a foundation on which to create long 
lasting positive effects on its profits relative to non-family firms where the board lasts for a 
short-duration. 
Demsetz & Lehn (1985) note that large concentrated investors may have economic incentives 
to curb agency problems and thereby maximize firm value. This is because their wealth is so ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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closely related to the future viability of the business that monitoring can ensure the growth of 
their income.  
A common characteristic of family firms is the need to fill up the top management positions, 
especially the coveted CEO post, with family members themselves. The presence of a family 
member in such a position makes the participation of the family in the business more ‘active’. 
Anderson & Reeb (2003) find that family firms perform better than non-family firm. There 
exists a non-linear relationship between family ownership levels and firm performance and 
firm performance is enhanced by the presence of a family CEO rather than an ‘outside’ CEO. 
Overall, their results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that family ownership adversely 
affects minority shareholders, suggesting that family ownership is an effective organizational 
structure. 
 
Section 2.2: Ownership and Firm Performance: How do they relate? 
The development of business in the UK was primarily born out of the innovations of the 
‘industrial revolution’. In particular there was a proliferation of manufacturing businesses run 
mainly  by  individuals  or  families  (Franks,  Mayer  &  Rossi,  2004).  These  industries  were 
primarily  labour-intensive.  However  progression  in  technology  led  to  the  development  of 
other  industries  like  electrical,  chemical,  and  transportation,  which  were  mostly  capital-
intensive.  Family  businesses  went  through  a  massive  transformation  and  the  need  for 
specialized knowledge and skill to cope with economic changes created the ‘management’ 
class. Small family businesses were soon turned into modern corporations where the family 
owners were increasingly forced to relinquish their rights to take decisions and instead work 
with the ideas of their ‘wiser’ employees (Colli, 2003). The separation of ownership and 
management is well documented by  Berle and  Means (1932) while subsequent  work  has 
focused on determining the ideal ownership structure.  
The effect on performance of a separation of ownership and management is discussed in 
Jensen & Meckling’s (1976) agency theory. They highlight the need for managers to align 
their interests with shareholders by becoming shareholders themselves. This reduces agency 
costs and prevents management from expropriating non-pecuniary benefits from the owners. 
However, Fama & Jensen (1983) find that if management shareholdings exceed a certain level 
then the firm is faced with ‘cost of capital’ problems. This decreases market liquidity and 
decreases  diversification  opportunities  as  the  management,  being  entrenched  in  the  firm, ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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makes it difficult to allocate resources via takeovers. Shleifer & Vishny (1986) suggest that a 
large minority shareholder (e.g. the management team) can block value-enhancing takeovers, 
again damaging the firm and its other shareholders. 
This means that theoretically at least there exists an optimal ownership structure that will 
minimize agency costs, reduce cost of capital problems and maximize firm value. Several 
empirical researches into establishing this optimal ownership structure have been undertaken.
4 
Most of the empirical work suggests a non-linear relationship between ownership and firm 
performance which is positive for lower levels of ownership but changes direction at higher 
ownership levels.  The  exact threshold for  the  change in this ownership-firm performance 
relationship is different for different researchers. Anderson & Lee (1997) find that the results 
of some of these studies could only have been obtained by using inferior quality ‘surrogate’ 
data sources. The optimal ownership level is therefore hard to determine and could depend on 
the data source as well as the country in question.  
When we talk about family firms we need to add a third dimension to the ownership debate. 
Usually  the  research  into  ownership  takes  into  account  management  and  shareholders. 
However, family firm researchers need to accept the complexities and motivations of a third 
class of shareholder- the family.  
As we have already seen, family firms have a number of advantages as well as disadvantages 
compared  with  their  non-family  competitors.  The  impact  on  performance  is  difficult  to 
ascertain because of the lack of empirical literature in this area. Most work has focused on 
management  ownership  and  its  relationship  with  firm  performance.  Even  these  empirical 
studies do not provide a consensus on the most advantageous ownership structure. Due to the 
generic differences between family and management ambitions and needs, these studies do 
not provide an accurate picture of the relationship between family ownership and its effect on 
firm performance. The first step in understanding these differences is at the stage where the 
family firm turns to the market for capital by becoming public. It is at this stage that most 
firms will turn to a mixed form of management – family and professional managers – and that 
the ownership structure can be seen to affect performance. However because of the complex 
ownership structure and the differences in the motivations of all the classes of shareholders it 
would be difficult to relate ownership and performance directly. We hope to shed light on this 
issue by considering how investors judge the reputation of both family and non-family firms, 
and hence their potential as investments. 
                                                      
4 Morck et al. (1988); Wruck (1989); McConnell & Servaes (1990); Stulz (1988); Mudambi & Nicosia (1995) ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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Section 2.3: What encourages investors to invest in firms? 
 
A good reputation is vital for success. It also helps firms to recover following a crisis. Quinn 
(2004)  describes  how  firms  with  strong  reputations  recover  from  crises.  While  they  can 
expect to see their share prices fall by, on average, 3% during a crisis year, firms with poorer 
reputations can expect to see a 12% decline in share price
5. 
Srivastava et al. (1997) find that the higher is a firm’s reputation, the lower the returns it 
requires to maintain its market value. Jones, Jones & Little (2000) note that in times of an 
unexpected decline in stock prices the decrease is far less for firms with good reputations. 
However, they also note that reputation alone is not an effective shield in times of crisis and 
may be ineffective in protecting the firm from panicked investors. 
The  fundamental  question  we  ask  is:  What  makes  investors  invest  in  family  firms?  The 
answer may lie in the intrinsic qualities that differentiate family- from non-family firms. The 
reputation  of  a  firm  as  an  investment  opportunity  is  determined  by  a  host  of  other 
characteristics as well. Both sets of factors can be put together in an index, which helps 
measuring the ‘investment reputation’ of a firm. But how do such reputation indices relate to 
performance?  
Several researchers have used a ‘qualitative study’ of the reputation of a firm (like the Fortune 
Survey)
6 and related it to performance. Schultz et al. (2000) studied the tendency of certain 
firms  to  remain  in  the  same  position  on  the  reputation  index  even  though  the  factors 
influencing  the  construct  of  the  index  were  changing.  This  is  referred  to  as  ‘sticky’ 
reputations. While taking the overall reputation index as a dependent variable and the various 
components  of  the  index  as  independent  variables  they  found  that  ‘perceived’  financial 
performance  was  highly  significant.  It  also  exerted  maximum  influence  on  corporate 
reputation.  
Sobol & Farell (1988) using various financial performance measures like EPS (Earning per 
Share), P/E ratio (Price-earning ratio), and DPS (Dividend per Share) for 10 years before the 
construction of the index (thus taking the lag effects of reputation) showed that the influence 
                                                      
5  The  results  are  based  on  Dr.  Deborah  Pretty’s  2001  study  presented  in  ‘Reputation  &  Value:  The  Case  of  Corporate 
Catastrophe’. The reference however was obtained from the  ‘Corporate Reputations: Don’t  Give  Them Something to Talk 
About’ by L.R. Quinn (2004) published in the Financial Executive. 
6 The Fortune magazine conducts an annual survey on corporate reputations and publishes them in the January/February special 
issue  called  ‘America’s  Most  Admired  Corporations’.  Over  8000  executives  and  outside  industry  experts  are  asked  to  rate 
organizations within their industry on 8 attributes. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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of firm performance varies across the various components of the Fortune survey and also 
varies between industries. 
Fombrun  &  Shanley  (1990)  present  a  model  of  reputation  building  in  the  presence  of 
incomplete information and empirically test it on 292 large US firms. They present the idea 
that respondents judge a firm by its market and accounting signals, institutional signals and 
strategic signals. They found a strong significance of the reputation of a firm (as judged by 
the Fortune Survey) with profitability, market to book ratio, risk and media visibility. 
The above papers are empirical investigation into the Fortune survey of ‘America’s Most 
Admired Corporations’ which is a reputation index based on 8 qualitative factors. It is a 
survey-based assessment of the reputation of firms where around 8000 executives and outside 
industry experts are asked to rate organizations within their industry. The problem with such 
estimations of reputation is that they are affected by the perceptions of the respondents. The 
fact that ‘firm performance or profitability’ is such a strong factor in the determinant of the 
reputation of a firm suggests a serious flaw in building a reputation index based on surveys. 
But then again to simply base one’s opinion of a company on one financial figure is not 
prudent, as we know that figures can be manipulated. Therefore we propose to set up an Index 
combining  a  number  of  recognized  governance,  market  and  accounting  measures  into  a 
composite index, which will help measure the reputation of a firm as investment without the 
complications that ‘surveys’ can create. 
 
Section 3: The Investment Reputation Index  
 
We have seen that some characteristics of family firms are value-enhancing (e.g. long-term 
perspective) while others are value-reducing (e.g. entrenchment/other). This means that the 
investor cannot judge a firm simply by noting that it is or is not a family firm. The investment 
reputation index uses six characteristics of “familiness” in order to highlight the positive and 
negative aspects of family businesses. The index also includes eleven other attributes derived 
from  previous  work  on  reputation.  These  governance  and  performance  attributes  apply 
equally to family and non-family firms. 
The index is calculated in a simple way. A firm scores one point for each attribute that has a 
positive impact on reputation. This means that the investment reputation index for any given 
family firm must lie between 0 and 17. The components of the index are listed in Table I. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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The familial factors are the presence of the founder or founders on the board, the number of 
additional family members on the board, the level of family involvement and the value of the 
firm as a long-term investment. The presence on the board of the single founder or multiple 
founders  of  the firm  is deemed  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  reputation.  This  is  because 
founder(s) possess unique knowledge and expertise with regards to the needs of the business 
that a professional manager may find difficult to replicate. However, as more family members 
sit on the board the possibility of collusion leading to the expropriation of income becomes 
more likely. For this reason a firm scores one point if no other family members sit on the 
board.  The  remaining  11  factors  can  be  collectively  known  as  the  ‘non-family’  specific 
reputation provisions as their addition to the Index will enhance the reputation of any firm and 
not  specifically  a  family  firm.  Table  I  provides  a  detailed  list  of  the  factors  and  their 
measurement. Few anomalies exist between family- and non-family firms. If a family member 
is present on the remuneration committee it has a negative effect on the investment reputation 
of the family firm. However the converse is true for an executive director in non-family firms. 
Therefore  a  different  scoring  process  is  used.  Similarly  the  Board  ratio  (ratio  of  non-
executives to total board members) of family firms when equal to or above ½ has a positive 
impact on performance. However the same is not true for non-family firms. When non-family 
firms tend to have a board ratio of ½ or more they perform poorly. These present some 
interesting points. The Higgs report (2003) does not make a distinction between types of firms 
with regards to their governance. However, there is a need to investigate this fact if these 
results are consistent over a larger data period. Also we find an anomaly with Dividend Yield. 
We  find  that  for  family  firms  a  dividend  yield  less  than  sector  averages  awards  it  with 
superior reputation but the opposite is true for non-family firms.   
The index can be calculated with or without the set of family characteristics. A classification 
of the different index calculations used is given below: 
•  Index1 – This is calculated by taking all the 6 familial provisions as well as the 11 
non-family specific provisions of the index for only the family firms of the sample. 
Therefore the total highest score of the index can be 17.  
•  Index2 – This is calculated by taking out the 6 familial provisions from Index1 and 
recalculating with just the non-family specific provisions of the Index for the family 
firms of the sample. Therefore the total highest possible index score is 11 for a family 
firm. This index in conjunction with Index1 can be used to determine the effects of 
these familial provisions on the sample of family firms. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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•  Index3  –  This  is  calculated  by  taking  the  11  non-family  specific  factors  for  the 
matched sample of family- and non-family firms. Therefore the highest possible index 
score can be 11. This index takes exactly the same provisions for both the types of 
firms – family and non-family – essentially ignoring the family attributes and judging 
the two on the same platform. 
•  Index4 – This is calculated by including the 6 familial provisions into the index score 
of Index3 for the matched family firms. Therefore the highest possible score for the 
matched family firms becomes 17, which makes a comparison with non-family firms 
hard. So to bring them both into comparable standards we divide each of the total 
index scores of the family and non-family firms by their highest possible index score, 
17 and 11 respectively. This can be used to see if firms with more family attributes 
perform differently from those with fewer family characteristics and how the family 
firms as a unit compare to their non-family competitors. For example, a family firm 
with an index score of 9 will get a final score of 0.529 (i.e. 9/17) and a similar score of 
9 by a non-family firm will give it 0.818 (i.e. 9/11) score on this index. 
 
The idea is to provide an ‘investment reputation’ score for every family firm and then to 
match it with a sample of non-family firms who are ranked by the ‘11’ non-family specific 
provisions. This comparison will help us determine whether the reputations of the two classes 
of  firms  are  comparable.  It  will  also  establish  the  importance  of  differentiating  between 
family firms on the basis of the family provisions and will determine the effect of these on the 
investment reputation of a family firm. 
 
Section 4: Data and Methodology 
 
Section 4.1: The Sample 
 
We have constructed a database of British family firms. In order to qualify as a family firm, 
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Table I 
Index Provision   
Familial Factors (only applicable to family firms)   
Founder  Present – 1 score  
Multi-founder  Present – 1 score  
Value as a long-term investment  P/E Ratio – rank portfolio – 1 score to top half 
No other family member on board  Absent – 1 score  
Level of family involvement  Herfindalh  Index  –  measure  shareholder 
concentration  -  1  score  to  bottom  half  of 
portfolio 
Cubbin-Leech Alpha – measure shareholder 
control – 1 score to bottom half of portfolio 
Non-Family Specific Factors:   
Family/Executive Director not on remuneration 
Committee 
Absent – 1 score (for family firms) 
Present – 1 score (for non-family firms) 
Ratio of non-executives to executives    on the 
Board 
Ratio >= 1/2 – 1 score (for family firms) 
Ratio <= 1/2 – 1 score (for non-family firms) 
Quality of Management  Two Criteria: 
Executive  directors  –  If  half  of  the  executive 
board  members  are  on  other  company  boards 
(listed/unlisted) – 1 score 
Non-Executive directors – If more than half of the 
non-executive  board  members  are  on  other 
company boards (only listed) – 1 score 
Net Gearing Ratio  If < than sector averages – 1 score  
Dividend Yield 
 
If  <  than  sector  average  –  1  score  (for  family 
firms) 
If > than sector average – 1 score (for non-family 
firms) 
Institutional Ownership  Present – 1 score 
Accounting Risk  Coefficient of variation of ROIC of 3 years – rank 
portfolio – 1 score to bottom half  
Market risk adjusted return  Treynor Ratio – rank portfolio – 1 score to bottom 
half 
Use of corporate resources  ROCE  &  Operating  Margin  -  >  than  sector 
averages – 1 score 
Note: A detailed list of the provisions of the index and its construction in provided in Appendix 1  
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definition of a family firm
7. For a family to exert sufficient control they must be part of 
management. Family control also depends on the amount of share ownership of the family as 
a whole compared to the rest of the shareholders. We take ownership levels above 3%
8 to 
signify  substantial  shareholding.  Based  on  this  we  identify  firms  with  the  following 
characteristics as family firms: 
•  The  founder  of  the  company  who  is  present  as  an  active  manager  as  well  as 
shareholder. He may have other family members on the board or as shareholders. We 
believe that firms like Body Shop PLC and Amstrad PLC should also be included 
into the definition of a family firm because of the influence an entrepreneur can have. 
•  Founders who have jointly established the company, for example two founders. It 
may  happen  that  both  the  founders  are  part  of  the  management  and  are  also 
shareholders.  In  which  case  they  are  treated  as  a  single  entity.  However,  if  two 
individuals establish the company and only one of them is part of the management, 
while  the  other  remains  only  as  a  shareholder,  then  they  are  treated  as  separate 
entities. The idea is that as one of the founders is now only a shareholder so he has 
less control over his co-founder and may also not support him in certain corporate 
decision i.e. he will act then as a normal shareholder. 
•  Descendent(s) of a family still running a family business. It might be that only one 
family  member  is  on  the  board  but  many  family  members  are  present  only  as 
shareholders. It however should be considered as a family concern as they can all 
collude against other shareholders. Alternatively there may be more than one family 
member on the board and only one family shareholder. This too is a family firm as 
the other board members may endorse corporate decisions that appeal to the family 
alone.  
The main point that comes forward is that all the family firms have had family influence right 
from the time it was incorporated. This means that the family ideology, which gives it many 
of its unique characteristics, can permeate into the framework of the business. The family 
firms were identified using Hemscott Academic Guru and Mint to determine the current board 
membership,  which  gives  some  indication  of  family  involvement.  To  check  that  the 
                                                      
7 Shanker and Astrachans’ (1996) ‘Middle’ definition of a family firm - founder/descendants run(s)    company, legal control of 
voting stocks, some family involvement. 
8 It may seem that 3% is a very low shareholding. However, Franks et al. (2004) in their study of the impact of family firms on the 
UK economy find certain differences with Continental Europe where family firms are still dominant. In the UK the efforts of 
family members were focused on control of the company rather than shareholding. So they were apt to secure more board seats 
rather than shares. This means that they are still in a position to exert family influence.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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involvement dated back to the incorporation of the firm (to ensure that the familial features 
are ingrained into the business framework) we used the Waterlow Stock Exchange Yearbooks 
and Incorporation documents obtained from Companies House, Cardiff. This gave us 199 
family firms. Of these, 55 firms are part of the FTSE All Share index, 82 firms are listed on 
AIM and the remaining 56 firms are in the Fledgling index. The data required to construct the 
index  for  2003  was  collected  from  Hemscott  Academic  Guru,  Hemscott  Premium  and 
DataStream. Tables II-IV provides descriptive statistics for the sample of family firms. 
Table II shows that the average family shareholding is 33.2%. Around 59.3 % (i.e. 118/199) 
of the sample firms have a shareholding of 25% or more, for this group the average family 
shareholding is 45.5%. Only 9.04% (i.e. 18/199) firms have family shareholdings less than 
10%. However, the lowest family shareholding is still greater than the threshold 3%. The 
largest family shareholding is 98.25% for a firm registered on the AIM. As mentioned above 
the bulk of the family firms are from the AIM, which is not regulated in the same way as the 
primary market. The AIM is the fastest growing market in the UK and is mainly entered into 
by start-ups and venture capitalists. There is no restriction on the fraction of shares that need 
to  be  in  public  hands. Therefore  the  large  shareholding  that  some  family  start-ups  could 
command is not surprising. Table III provides additional statistics on firms where non-family 
management is the dominant shareholder. We find that around 27 firms in the sample appear 
to have larger joint management shareholdings than the family for the year 2003. Our analysis 
shows that the average difference in the shareholdings is 9.44%. If we look at the index score 
of management dominated firms we find that on average the scores for this type of family 
firm are higher (i.e. 10.15 > 8). On analyzing the performance of these firms we observe that 
they  have  lower  performance  when  compared  to  the  family  dominant  firms.  The  results 
however  are  not  presented  here.  Also  their  number  is  too  small  to  warrant  a  serious 
investigation into this aspect. But it is noteworthy that family firms, where the management is 
a dominant shareholder, fulfil a larger fraction of the provisions of the Investment Reputation 
Index.  
Table IV presents the sector break down of our family firms. The classifications of the sectors 
are as per the London Stock Exchange. We find that family firms are spread throughout the 
sectors but a large proportion of the sample comes from Software & Computer Services (28), 
Real  Estate  (23),  Support  Services  (21),  General  Retailer  (16)  and  Household  Goods  & 
Textiles (15).  
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Section 4.2: The Investment Reputation Index values for the sample of family firms  
 
The Investment Reputation Index is measured by giving each provision a score of 1 if it adds 
to the reputation of a firm as an investment. The index construction is kept simple so that 
provisions can be added and valued quite straightforwardly. However the important point to 
remember is that the family firms are scored on the basis of 17 provisions, i.e. Index1. Table 
V presents the Investment Reputation Index values for the complete set of family firms. Our 
analysis shows that the mean score of Index1 for family firms is 8.95 out of the total score of 
17. The most frequent score is 9, though the range of the score is quite high at 12. We find 
that maximum index scores for family firms are around 9 and 10 with 31 and 25 firms in that 
score bracket respectively. Only around 7 firms score higher than 15 with none getting a 
complete score of 17 on the index. In general we do find an equitable distribution of scores 
throughout the sample. On analysis of Table VI we find that there are 91 founder firms and 
another 29 firms with more than one founder. The mean score and maximum-minimum index 
scores for the multi-founder established firms are better than score of founder firms. There are 
80 firms where there is more than one family member present on the board. We find that the 
average scores of such firms are lower than firms where management only has one family 
member.  This lends some  support to our  premise earlier that a firm with  more than one 
founder and with only one family member has a better environment for building its reputation 
and meeting the various criteria of the index. 
From Table VII we get a list of the Investment Reputation Index scores for family firms listed 
on the FTSE All Share, AIM and the Fledgling. The mean scores for the FTSE firms are the 
highest at 9.79 followed by AIM at 8.95. The range of the scores for the FTSE All Share 
firms are lower than the rest which gives credence to the idea that being included in a properly 
regulated market helps a firm satisfy more of the criteria that build the Investment Reputation 
Index.  
 
Section 4.3: The Investment Reputation Index values for the matched sample of non-family 
firms 
 
The  Investment  Reputation  Index  is  meant  to provide  a  useful  guide to  investors  on  the 
characteristics that help to add value to a family firm. However in the market an investor is 
faced with several choices and the effect of the Investment Reputation Index on non-family ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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firms must also be tested. For comparison we build a matched sample of non-family firms. 
They are matched with the family firms on a number of criteria. The first factor being its 
Stock Market Listing (i.e. FTSE All Share, AIM or Fledgling). This is important because 
from an investor’s point of view the distinction can be crucial to judge the soundness of his 
investments. The second factor is Sector of the firm. The performance of a firm will depend 
largely on its production and operational costs, which is dependent on its sector. The third 
criterion is Size, which was taken as the natural logarithm of total assets of a firm in 2003. 
Besides this for any firm to successfully establish a reputation as an investment it needs to be 
in operation for at least three years
9. Therefore, this fourth criterion is implicit in the matching 
process. We could not find a match for 47 family firms. So the matched sample rendered 152 
matched non-family firms because of the need to meet all the different criteria. Therefore the 
final matched sample (i.e. when we put the matched family firms as well) is 304 firms. The 
average difference in size
10 is 0.49%. The median difference is –0.12% and the standard 
deviation is 8.89%.  
When we look at the sample distribution of the Investment Reputation Index for only the 
matched sample of non-family firms in Table VIII we find that the mean scores are around 
4.84
11.  The  range  of the index score is  6 with  the  highest  score being 8. The maximum 
frequency of score seems to be in the score brackets of 4, 5 and 6 with frequencies of 32, 29 
and 32 respectively. A comparison with Table V and VI is inconclusive as the table provides 
analysis on the complete set of family firms and not the matched sample. However, Table IX 
provides a thorough comparison of the index scores for the matched family and non-family 
firms on the FTSE All Share, AIM and Fledgling. The index value presented in the table is 
the value of the Investment Reputation Index when the familial provisions for the family 
firms are not applied, i.e. Index3. Panel A presents the index scores by ‘listing’ for matched 
non-family firms. We observe that the mean score of a matched non-family firm on the FTSE 
All  Share  is  well  below  the  average  score  on  AIM  and  Fledgling  (i.e.  4.74<5.05>4.61, 
respectively). When compared to the index score of the matched sample of family firms in 
Panel B for the FTSE All Share, which is 6.32, it seems especially low. Family firms may 
require the discipline of a strictly regulated market like the FTSE to be able to meet the 
requirements of being a healthy company to invest in. However, the matched non-family 
                                                      
9 The listing requirements for the London stock exchange on the official market requires that at least 3 years of published 
accounts be available.  
10 The difference in size is calculated by taking (1- size of family firm/ size of non-family firm). 
11 It must be noted here that certain index provisions for non-family firms follow a reverse trend as compared to non-family 
firms. Table I provides a brief insight into this feature while Appendix 1 presents a detailed explanation. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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firms are comprised of smaller sized firms (as most of the family firms in general tend to be 
smaller). This adds pressure to the existing structure of the company when they are regulated 
to the standards required by the FTSE. The matched non-family firms on the AIM cope much 
better than their FTSE counterparts. This may be because the size of operations as well as the 
rules suit this particular matched sample of non-family firms compared to the other. It is 
interesting to point out at this stage that the index behaves differently for family- and non-
family firms for 3 index provisions. An examination of Table I presents the anomalies. There 
are certain governance rules meant to be complied with by firms when they become public 
(Higgs Report, 2003). We found that these rules if applied to non-family firms usually reduce 
their value.  
Panel B of Table IX also presents an interesting fact. The maximum index score by a matched 
family firm is 11 on the FTSE All Share. A study of the raw data revealed that only one firm 
meets all the criteria set forth by Index3. However, the range of index scores (i.e. 6) for the 
rest of the family firms are substantially large meaning that most of the firms do not possess 
perfect investment reputations.  
 
Section 4.4: Performance Measure and Control Variables 
 
Tobin’s Q is often used as a market measure of performance and has been extensively used in 
research related to ownership (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003). Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of assets divided by the replacement 
value of assets. It is a measure of the market’s assessment of the value of the assets and the 
future profitability of investment opportunities. When Q exceeds one – where market value of 
assets exceeds the replacement cost of assets – the company can increase profits by investing. 
If ‘Q’ is less than 1 it means that the firm is over investing and the market is acknowledging 
that.   
We follow Gompers, Ishii, and Metricks’ (2003) computation of Q. The market value of an 
asset is measured by taking the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of 
common stock less the sum of the book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred 
taxes. A proxy in the form of book value of total assets is taken for the replacement value of 
assets. All the book values are taken for the fiscal year 2003 and combined with market 
values taken at the calendar end of year 2003. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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A number of control variables have to be introduced into the equation to control for factors 
that might have an impact on   Q. We need to ensure that the relationship between Q and the 
Index  as  established  by  the  regression  is  not  a  spurious  result  created  by  the  correlation 
between these two variables and the omitted variables. The control variables included are 
Firm Size, Leverage, Growth, Inclusion in the FTSE All Share, Research & Development, 
Capital Expenditure and Firm Age. 
Firm  size  is  measured  by  taking  the  natural  logarithm  of  total  assets.  The  expected 
relationship between size and firm value is negative. This is presumed because larger firms 
are expected to be in a more mature business cycle. Tobin’s Q is also an assessment of the 
resources in place as well as the future viability of the business. If the firm has reached a 
saturation point with regards to business growth, then the market may pick up these factors.  
Leverage is defined as the book value of long-term debt divided by the total assets of the firm. 
The presence of debt could have a two-pronged effect. On the one hand it could have a 
negative effect on firm value if these debts increase the chances of financial bankruptcy. At 
the same time debts need to be serviced and as such restrict the cash flow of the company. 
This  helps  in  disciplining  management  and  ensuring  that  there  are  no  unnecessary  profit 
diversions. The debtors also act as good overseers of firm activity to protect their investments 
and  as  such  endorse  profitable  investments  while  steering  the  company  from  wasteful 
expenditure. Therefore the real relationship between leverage and firm value is difficult to 
predict. 
Growth  is  measured  by  taking  the  average  of  the  growth  in  Total  Sales  (year  to  year 
differences) over a period of 3 years prior to the establishment of the Investment Reputation 
Index.  The  expected  relationship  is  positive  because  higher  sales  growth  represents  fast 
growing companies that have a higher valuation.  
We have also accounted for the fact that inclusion into the FTSE All Share might have a 
positive  impact  on  firm  value.  This  is  primarily  because most  of  these  firms  have  to  go 
through rigorous  scrutiny  year  after year from the market and  have  to adhere  to specific 
accounting regulations. All these might help to provide a sound base for the company and in 
turn  increase  their  performance.  Therefore  this  control  variable  is  included  as  a  dummy 
variable with a value of 1 given to a firm if it is included in the FTSE All Share. 
Research & Development expenses divided by Total Sales can measure growth opportunities 
of a business. This will help establishing the part of sales earnings diverted towards research. 
The expected relationship between Tobin’s Q and this measure of growth is positive.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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The next control variable is Capital Expenditure scaled by Total Assets. The relationship is 
expected to be positive as more capital expenditure signals greater growth in the market and 
as such leads to higher firm valuations. 
Firm age is another control variable, which is represented by firm years, which is calculated 
by  taking  the  number  of  years  the  firm  has  been  in  operation  since  it  went  public.  For 
normality in the data we take the natural logarithm of firm age. The relationship is expected to 
be negative simply because the presence of mature firms will mean that they have already 
passed  the  growth  stage  and  as  such  their  firms  will  suffer  from  lower  valuation  as  the 
expectations associated with the firm decrease with age. 
 
Section 4.5: Summary Statistics 
 
Tables X and XI provide the descriptive information for our sample of family firms and 
matched sample of family and non-family firms respectively. Panel A of Table X and XI  
provides the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum for the performance 
measure, Q, the appropriate Investment Reputation Index and control variables in our sample. 
Panel B in Table X provides us with a simple correlation matrix between the variables in the 
family firm sample. Panel B, C and D of Table XI shows us the individual descriptive of the 
family firm and the non-family firm within the matched sample. It also presents us with a 
difference of means test for the key variables between the two sets of matched firms.  
From our analysis of Panel A in Table X we find that the performance measure, Q, has a 
mean of 1.83 with a maximum of 7.08 and a minimum of –1.85. The two measures of the 
Investment Reputation Index are Index1 and Index2 which have been explained in Section 3. 
The average Growth, represented by the proportional difference is the sales growth over a 
three-year period, of the family firms is around 0.09. Capital expenditure and Leverage are 
taken as a ratio of Total Assets and R&D as a proportion of Total Sales. Capital expenditure is 
on average 0.07% of Total assets. Leverage (or in this case Long Term Debt) and R&D 
account for 0.11% and 0.03% of Total Assets and Total Sales respectively. Firm Age is as 
high as 104 as well as a minimum of 4 years for family firms. However, the average firm age 
is 15.97, suggesting that the sample contains a greater proportion of younger firms. This is not 
surprising judging by the sector break down of our family firms. The strong presence of 
family firms in the Services sector and the AIM suggests the dominance of young founder 
established start-ups coupled with younger family enterprises.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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Panel B of the same table provides a correlation matrix of the key variables. Index1
12 seems 
to  have  a  positive  association  with  firm  performance,  Q.  Other  variables  like  Capital 
Expenditure, Research & Development, Inclusion in the FTSE and Size all have the predicted 
relationship with Q. However, Growth has a negative association with Q, which is contrary to 
our supposition. 
Panel A of the Table XI looks at the descriptive characteristics of the matched sample. Here 
the Investment Reputation Index (Index3) is measured by not taking the familial provisions. 
Therefore the highest any firm can score on this index is 11. The second measure of the 
Investment Reputation Index presented in the table is Index4. The mean performance of the 
firms is 1.76 with a high of 8.69 and a low of –0.362. The high Q value comes from a 
matched non-family firm. The control variables behave much like the family firm data with 
the exception of the Growth variable. Growth now has a higher mean value of 0.64.  
Panel B, C and D of the same table show us the means and difference of means test for the 
key variables. We can see the individual descriptive for each of the key variables for each of 
the separate sets within the matched sample: family and non-family firms. As we can observe 
in Table XI the average of the Investment Reputation Index for both types of calculated index 
values is higher for the family firm and that this difference is significant. However, if you 
look at the range of the minimum and maximum values for these two indices, one would find 
that it is smaller for the non-family firms. This means that even though the mean index score 
of family firms are higher these are caused by a few firms scoring high on some of the 
provisions of the index and may not be applicable for the entire set.  The mean firm age of a 
family firm is slightly larger that the non-family firms and is also significant. We can see that 
the Growth of non-family firms is much larger than the family firms but a conclusion is hard 
to draw, as the results are not significant. Research & Development as a proportion of Total 
Sales is higher for non-family firms but not significantly high enough.  
 
Section 5:  Investment Reputation Index and Performance- Model 1 
 
The Index is built from the point of view of investors to help them judge the reputation of a 
firm as an investment opportunity. As we have discussed before the main component that 
drives any index is the performance of the firm. To evaluate the efficiency of the Index it is 
                                                      
12 The index in consideration is the complete index with all the familial factors. Thus the maximum a firm can score on this index 
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therefore important to test the impact of the Index on firm value. Model 1 helps us achieve 
this while also serving the dual purpose of evaluating the importance of family characteristics 
to investors.  
The equation presented before is used to test the relationship between the Index and firm 
performance given by ‘Q’. We use a range of control variables mentioned earlier to ensure 
that the relationship between the two key variables are not spurious. 
 
Q = a0 + a1 Index + a2 Firm age + a3 FTSE + a4 Size + a5 Growth + a6 Capex +  
       a7 R&D + a8 Lev               (1)   
             
 
Where 
Q-   is a market measure of firm performance taken as the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets 
Index-   represents the total score of the Investment Reputation Index based on certain 
provisions stated earlier 
Firm Age-  is taken as the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has been listed 
FTSE-  is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when a company is listed on the FTSE 
All Share 
Size-  is measured as the natural logarithm of Total Assets 
Growth-  represents the sales growth over three years (2001-2003) 
Capex-  is capital expenditure as a proportion of Total Assets 
R&D-  is measured as a proportion of Total Sales 
Lev-  represents the proportion of Long Term Debt to Total Assets 
 
Section 5.1: Regression Analysis of Investment Reputation Index and Performance for Family 
Firms 
 
We collect data for 199 family firms on the Index and other key variables for the year 2003. 
For a reputation index to work it has to affect performance positively otherwise the reputation 
of the firm is meaningless. To evaluate this relationship we run equation (1) as given above 
using the Investment Reputation Index scores of Index1 as well as a second index measure 
where  the  familial  factors  are  removed  and  the  score  recalibrated,  Index2.  We  initially ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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estimate  the  equations  using  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS).  However  on  examining  the 
residual  plots  we  find  considerable  evidence  of  heteroskedasticity  relating  to  capital 
expenditure/total  assets  (i.e.  CAPEX),  which  is  confirmed  by  running  a  White’s 
Heteroskedasticity test on the OLS estimates. We use two alternative means of correcting the 
heteroskedasticity.  The  first  is  to  correct  the  OLS  standard  errors  by  using  the  White 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors and covariance matrix. The second approach is to 
use a Weighted Least Square (WLS) estimate using Capex as the weighting variable. The 
results of the OLS using White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance 
matrix and WLS are reported in Table XII.  
Focusing on column (2) of the table mentioned above we can see that the coefficient of the 
Investment Reputation Index is positive and significantly related to performance. If a family 
firms Investment Reputation Index score increases by a unit it will improve performance. This 
means  that  the  index  helps  in  establishing  the  positive  relationship  that  we  want  with 
performance and as such the measurement of the index provisions provides the right direction. 
We also find that Firm Age is positive and significant meaning that as family firms get older 
they perform better. An investor interested in the well being of a firm will want to go for an 
investment which has the promise of future progress. Anderson & Reeb (2003) found that as 
family  firms  get  older  their  performance  is  less  positive  compared  to  their  younger 
counterparts. However, their sample had a mean family firm sample age of 85 years. The 
mean age of our family firm sample is almost 16 years signalling that there are far more 
younger  firms  than  older  ones.  Also  around  91  of  family  firms  are  founder  run,  which 
according to prior research adds value to a firm. The size variable has a negative relation to 
performance as was expected. As the firm grows in size the potential for growth saturates. It 
is interesting to note that the inclusion of a family firm stock in the FTSE All Share leads to a 
positive reaction in performance, as the family firm needs to adhere to strict regulations and 
governance practices. An increase in the capital expenditure as a proportion of total assets 
(Capex) will give positive performance because the expenditure in these particular resources 
will add to the expansion and growth of the business. However, the expected relationship 
between R & D and performance, which is positive, is not achieved. This is because of the 
‘small’ size and ‘younger’ age of these family businesses. As Research & Development is 
taken as a proportion of Total Sales we may observe that many of these firms do not have 
monetary resources to equip themselves for product development yet. However, many of the 
firms do spend a lot on Research & Development with one family company spending 1.16 ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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times their sales figures (Table X, Panel A). This might be needed in the first stages of a 
business to help in future growth but the market may be waiting to pass judgment on the 
impact  of  such  expenditure.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Leverage  (Long  term  debt/total 
assets) for a family firm exhibits a negative relationship with performance. This is not unusual 
as family firms to relieve the burden of taking on more shareholders (which minimizes their 
ownership share in the firm) may accept more debt, which could be at the detriment of the 
business. The shareholders and the market may not look favourably at such a move.  
Table XII also presents a second set of OLS estimates using White heteroskedastic- consistent 
standard errors and covariance matrix and WLS estimates (Columns 3 & 4). However, the 
Investment Reputation Index computed for this regression is Index2. We now take an index 
score without the 6 familial provisions (i.e. the highest possible index score now is 11). Now 
the family firm is treated by investors like any other firm.  The significance of this WLS 
regression is better understood when compared to the WLS coefficient estimates presented 
before. When we compare the coefficients of the ‘Index’ variable we find that an increase in 
this  second  measure  of  the  index  has  a  significant  and  strong  positive  relationship  with 
performance.  Ideally  if  the  family  firm  scores  a  single  point  on  any  on  the  ‘non-family 
specific’ factors, the performance for the same set of family firms will increase 1.6 times 
more than the previous coefficient estimates of Index1 and performance. What this brings out 
is that when an investor looks at a family firm and assesses it, without taking into account the 
familial factors (almost as if the firm being family is not registered by the investor), then an 
increase in their reputation as an investment has a better impact on performance. However, as 
soon as it is recognized as a family firm and the familial attributes are added in the index the 
strength of their positive relationship with performance wanes. This basically shows some 
negative association when a firm is recognized as a family concern.  
This  can  be  because  of  cultural  and  historical  aspects.  We  have  very  strong  investor 
protection  market  in  the  UK.  And  this  might  have  triggered  a  negative  outlook  to  any 
company  that  trades  in  the  market  and  is  also  a  family  firm.  The  emergence  of  hostile 
takeover bids forced many of the family firms to seek protective measures like dual-class 
share, pyramids and strategic block holdings. However, financial institutions together with the 
stock  exchange  stopped  the  access  of  these  firms  to  the  capital  market.  This  led  to  the 
dismantling of these protective aspects and the dilution of family ownership. This historical 
aspect, where family firms used extensive measures to secure their ownership in the firm, ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
Copyright © 2005 Mukherjee and Padgett.    27 
   
might  have  bred  deep  distrust  in  the  capital  market  which  might  still  continue  among 
investors today.  
 
Section  5.2:  Regression  Analysis  of  Investment  Reputation  Index  and  Performance  for 
Matched Sample of Non-family Firms 
 
As for the set of family firms we need to establish that the index will help us in measuring the 
appropriate  Investment  Reputation  for  any  firm  and  will  also  detect  firms  with  better 
performance, thereby allowing an investor to cash in on the investment reputation of a firm. 
We collect data on 152 matched non-family firms for the Investment Reputation Index and 
other  key  variables  for 2003.  We  use two measures of the Investment Reputation Index, 
Index3 and Index4 and use Model 1 to determine a similar relationship to the one we derived 
for the family firm sample. We use similar methods of regression as mentioned in the sample 
of family firms. A Weighted Least Square (WLS) using Research & Development as the 
weight estimation helps in eliminating heteroskedasticity.  
Columns 2 and 4 of Table XIII show the estimates for the two index variables and other key 
variables.  As  with  the  sample  of  family  firms  both  indices  exhibit  a  strong  positive 
relationship with performance. Thus, the index helps to measure the investment reputation of 
a non-family firm and relates it positively to performance. This result means that we can go 
on to compare the two groups of firms. 
Focusing on column 2 and 4 of the same table we find that an increase in Firm age and 
inclusion in the FTSE All Share have a positive impact on performance as in the family firms 
sample.  However, Growth and CAPEX show a negative relationship with firm performance, 
Q. The fact that sales growth represents the growth prospects of a business seems not to be 
true for the matched sample of non-family firms. To draw a general conclusion for non-family 
firms based on our analysis is incorrect, as we have only taken a very small number of firms. 
However, the mean figure of growth for the matched sample of non-family firms (Table XI, 
Panel B & C) is almost 9 times that of the growth figures of the matched sample of family 
firms. This suggests that non-family firms of similar size tend to expand at a faster rate. 
Binder Hamlyn found that private unquoted non-family firms had a sales growth figure 4 
times that of family firms over a period of six years. However, ‘Q’ is sometimes considered to 
be a measure of future growth opportunity of a firm based on the resources available today. 
So probably the market expects these companies to reach a saturation point if they continue to ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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maintain their current growth rate. With regards to CAPEX it is probably because of the data 
period, which is one year. The market needs time to process such expenditure and wait to 
observe its impact on firm finances. In family firms a mere expenditure suggests the ‘good’ 
intentions of the family towards encouraging firm growth. The market may not be so lenient 
with non-family firms. 
 
Section  5.3:  Regression  Analysis  of  Investment  Reputation  Index  and  Performance  for 
Matched Sample of Non-family Firms – Model 2 
 
For our second model we take the matched sample of non-family firms based on stock market 
listing, sector and size with certain restriction on firm age. The final matched sample contains 
a total of 304 firm (N=304; Nff=152, Nnf=152).  
 
Q = a0 + a1 FF dummy + a2 Index + a3 Firm age + a4 FTSE + a5 Size + a6 Growth + 
        a7 Capex + a8 R& D + a9 Lev + a10 {FF_SD}               (2) 
        
Where 
Q-   is a market measure of firm performance taken as the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets 
Index-   represents the total score of the Investment Reputation Index based on certain 
provisions stated earlier 
Firm Age-  is taken as the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has been listed 
FTSE-  is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when a company is listed on the FTSE 
All Share 
Size-  is measured as the natural logarithm of Total Assets 
Growth-  represents the sales growth over three years (2001-2003) 
Capex-  is Capital Expenditure as a proportion of Total Assets 
R&D-  is measured as a proportion of Total Sales 
Lev-  represents the proportion of Long Term Debt to Total Assets 
FF dummy-  is a dummy variable, which is given a 1 if it is a family firm 
FF_SD-  is the slope differentials for family firms which is taken by multiplying the 
variable ‘FF dummy’ with the Index and each of the control variables ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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We introduce a family firm dummy variable, FF dummy, and slope differentials for the Index 
and other control variables. This will help to detect any differences in the relationship with 
performance between the family firm and non-family firm with regards to these variables. We 
again run OLS regressions on the equation (2) given above. However, running residual plots 
detects heteroskedasticity with the R&D variable. Using a Weighted Least Square (WLS) 
with  R&D  as  the  weight  estimation  helps  to  eliminate  the  heteroskedasticity.  The  WLS 
regression results are presented in Tabled XIV.  
Column 1 presents the results of the WLS regression using an Investment Reputation Index 
that scores the exact same factors for both the family and non-family firms of the matched 
sample, Index3. This basically means that we consider the two types of firm to be similar to 
each other and that the familial attributes that add to the reputation of a firm as an investment 
are not taken into consideration. The highest possible score for a firm for this index is 11. We 
find that the Index has a positive relationship with firm performance but as the index slope 
differential for the family firms is significant and negative it suggests a stronger relationship 
for non-family firms. A unit increase in the same index for a non-family firm will increase 
performance by 3 times higher than a comparable impact an increase in the index of a family 
firm would have on its performance. The fact that the mean index score of a matched sample 
of family firms is higher than a matched set of non-family firms (Table XI; Panel B & C) 
lends credence to the hypothesis that there may be a negative socio-economic reason for 
family firms to have lower reputation as an investment.  
A look at column 2 of the same table shows us the results of the WLS regression of equation 
(2) with Index4. The purpose of this second measure of the Investment Reputation Index is to 
take into account the extent that the family influences the firm. Column 1 of Table XIV 
makes the simple distinction of a family firm from a non-family firm without considering the 
question  ‘how  family  is  the  family  firm?’  This  second  measure  of  the  index  judiciously 
awards a family firm that follows good practices and possesses positive familial attributes 
(like founder being present, long-term family presence etc.) with a better reputation compared 
to family firms where the family overrides the general well being of an average shareholder to 
fulfil their own needs and ambitions. A study of the index coefficient in column 2 of the same 
table shows us that an increase in this second measure of index will increase performance by 
4.185. As the index slope differential is not statistically significant we can assume that there is 
now no distinction between the reputations of a family- and non-family firm as an investment 
opportunity. Therefore the distinction between family firms with regards to their ‘familial ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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influence’ is vital for an investor to consider before making an investment. These family 
factors added to the index help to raise the investment reputation of a family firm and an 
investor must be aware of this to make the most of his investment. Certain countries like 
Germany have investment firms specializing in maintaining a portfolio of family firm stocks 
for investors and they continuously outperform the market.  
A quick look at the FTSE slope differential in both the columns shows that inclusion in the 
FTSE All Share has less impact on performance for family, rather than non-family firms. This 
may reflect market expectations. A non-family firm will be expected to improve the quality of 
management.  However,  the  family  firms  may  suffer  from  a  static  board  (due  to  family 
members present on board), which is not suitable for the challenges that such a move will 
imply. We also find that the Growth slope differential for family firms is positively significant 
which reduces some of the negative impact of Growth on performance for non-family firms. 
Again this further explains the discussion in Section 5.2 on the mean growth differences of 
the two types of firms. The mean sales growth of non-family firms is almost 9 times that of 
family firms so the market probably expects a saturation point for non-family firms soon. 
 
Section 6: Summary and Conclusion 
 
Several family firm researchers have conducted theoretical and empirical investigations into 
the unique nature of family businesses. Recently there has been extensive research support for 
the good performance and governance practices of family firms. For example the Thomson 
Financial study into the family firm performance of six European countries revealed their 
superior performance as compared to their non-family competitors. However, we rarely see an 
application of these studies on investments in the real world. The very characteristics that 
build the unique nature of family businesses are ignored while determining the investment 
prospects of these types of firms. Our research explores the relationship between these unique 
family  features  and  its reputation  as  an  investment  opportunity.  We  combine  measurable 
familial  characteristics  with  non-family  specific  marketing  and  accounting  figures  to 
determine an Investment Reputation Index that measures the reputation of a family firm as an 
investment. To the best of our knowledge this is the first application of a reputation measure 
that incorporates familial factors on firm performance. 
Our analysis of the 199 UK family firms in our sample reveals that the Investment Reputation 
Index, Index1, has a positive relationship with firm performance, Q. This establishes that the ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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index is capable of measuring and combining the factors to help determine superior firm 
performance. When we take an alternative index measure, Index2, we get a stronger positive 
relationship with performance almost 1.6 times that of the previous analysis, signifying that 
recognizing some of these familial factors brings with it a reduction in the reputation of a 
firm. This means that when the same set of family firms are now treated like non-family firms 
their reputation suddenly reduces. This may be because of certain socio-economic reasons 
that have led to a negative association with family firms in the UK.  
To help delve deeper into the investment reputation of a family firm we take a matched 
sample of 152 non-family firms. The index for this set of firms was measured by taking the 
index  scores  without  the  familial  factors,  Index3.  The  Investment  Reputation  Index  of  a 
matched set of non-family firms also showed a strong positive relation to firm performance. 
Therefore the final analysis was a comparison of the matched sample of family and non-
family firms, which was a total sample of 304 firms. We found that when an Investment 
Reputation Index like Index3, which measures the index score for the two types of firms 
based on the exact same provisions, then the family firm’s relationship between reputation 
and  performance  is  positive  but  weaker  than  the  matched  set  of  non-family  firms.  The 
increase in the performance of a non-family firm caused by a unit increase in its reputation is 
3 times higher than a comparable increase in the investment reputation of a family firm. The 
fact that the mean score of the investment reputation index for a family firm is higher than a 
matched set of non-family firms just shows that the family firms seem to suffer from the 
negative effects of the ‘stigma’ associated with being a ‘family concern’ in a market-based 
economy. This is validated by our next regression results. Here we take a different measure of 
the Investment Reputation Index, Index4, which acknowledges the familial attributes for the 
matched set of family firms. The results now show that the reputations of both sets of firms 
have the exact same positive relationship with performance as the index slope differential is 
not  statistically  significant.  The  inclusion  of  family  factors  helps  in  stopping  the 
discrimination of family firms and sorts out the ‘good’ family firms from the ‘bad’. Thus, an 
investor can judge a family firm that follows good governance practices and invest in an 
organization that might provide him future profits. 
However, there is need for further analysis. By combining certain positive familial attributes 
and some common factors into an Investment Reputation Index we have shown that a family 
firm with good practices has a similar reputation to a comparable non-family firm. However, 
the next step is to determine if this translates into investment gains for an investor.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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In the process of our research we have found some startling differences with regards to certain 
governance practices between family- and non-family firms. According to the Higg’s Report 
at least half the board should be comprised of independent non-executive directors. In our 
analysis we found that those non-family firms in our matched sample having a board ratio of 
½ or more performed poorly. Since these firms were actually smaller than the average non-
family firm I feel an investigation into the appropriate board structure for smaller firms should 
be undertaken. The need for more executive directors in non-family firms may arise from the 
lack  of  expertise  among  the  breed  of  non-executive  directors  especially  in  our  matched 
sample  sectors  (i.e.  Software  and  Computer  Services,  Real  Estate,  Specialty  and  Other 
Finance etc.). For family firms however the board ratio may be appropriate to insure the 
independence of the board from the family. Another anomaly is with regards to the provision 
that a ‘Family/ Executive director not present on the remuneration committee’ adds value. We 
find a contrary result in this area for non-family firms. Again this could be because of the size 
of these firms.  The non-executive directors of the company may not be able to judge the 
appropriate compensation for the skill required in technical and service sectors especially if 
they do not have the experience to deal with these types of firms. Also we find a difference 
between family firms and non-family firms with regards to Dividend Yield (D/Y). When D/Y 
is lower than sector averages for family firms they have higher performance but with a non-
family firm we get opposite results. All this shows that there are certain important differences 
in governance  and dividend  policy between family and non-family firms  that need to be 
investigated. One proviso is that the data period is only over a year so these might not be 
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Founder member present on board: 
 
The effect of a founder family run firm can be positive. Prior research has shown that founder 
members  as  CEO’s  perform  better  than  professional  CEO  because  of  their  vision  and 
entrepreneurial skills (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). The founding member who has built the firm 
based on his own vision and innovativeness will tend to better understand the needs of the 
firm. A professional manager may face a steep learning curve (with regards to the firm) as 
compared to a founder due to the nature of the firm-specific knowledge that he possesses. 
Hence a founder member present on the board has a positive impact on the firm. 
 
Multi- founder members in the firm: 
 
Sometimes two or more separate individuals establish the business jointly. The advantage is 
that all  the  founders  still  possess  the  knowledge  that  sets a  founder  run  firm  apart  from 
professional  managed  firm  and  at  the  same  time  can  ensure  that  founder(s)  do  not  take 
advantage of the resources of the company to extract pecuniary benefits. Therefore a score of 
1 is given to any firm with two or more founders still on the board. 
 
Value as a long-term investment:  
 
The price-earning (P/E) ratio, which takes into account both prices and earnings of a firm, can 
be thought of as a ratio that reflects how much an investor is willing to pay for a dollar worth 
of earnings. So if investors feel that the future value of the company is looking good they will 
be willing to pay more for a dollar earning (Sobol and Farrelly, 1988). I have taken the 3-year 
average of the P/E ratios of each company and then ranked the firms in ascending order. We 
are effectively building an index that awards a single point to a company with greater long-
term vision. Therefore company’s that are in the top half of the portfolio (higher average P/E 
ratio’s) are awarded ‘1’. A similar methodology has been followed throughout the building of 
the index unless information regarding sector averages is readily available. 
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Level of family involvement: 
 
This can be evaluated by using a measure of contestability (Herfindahl index) and a measure 
of control (Cubbin-Leech index) exercised by family share ownership. Mudambi and Nicosia 
(1995) note that most empirical literature assume that managerial share ownership is also 
representative of the amount of control that they can exert without taking into consideration 
the ownership pattern in the rest of the firm. They use a Cubbin-Leech Index to evaluate the 
impact of control on firm performance and find that it’s not share ownership alone but control 
as well which helps explain the impact of ownership on performance.   
The Index uses a Herfindalh Index of contestability, which is basically the sum of the squares 
of the differences between the first and second largest owners and the second and third largest 
owners in the company. Example: If the three largest shareowners in the company have 20%, 
10% and 5% respectively; then the HI would give a value {(20-10)
2 + (10-5)
2} of 125. So the 
greater the difference between the shareholders the greater will be the contestability measure.  
The Cubbin-Leech index (A) to measure control is based on a formula 
Α =  m1/ (√H-m1
2) , where H=  (m1
2 + m2
2 + m3
2) and mi = i
th largest shareholder.  
It must be noted that ‘family ownership’ refers to the cumulated sum of the percentage of 
shares owned by all the members of the family. It is quite obvious from the formula above 
that  ‘A’  will  be  higher  when  the  family  has  a  large  share  compared  to  the  rest  of  the 
shareholders. Therefore minority shareholders are worse off at higher values of ‘A’. To rank 
the firms we use a similar approach as the factor above.  We set up the portfolio of firms in 
ascending  order  for  both  the  contestability  and  control  measure.  The  bottom  half  of  the 
portfolio is given a score of 1 because it is better to have lower values of the two measures. 
 
 
Ratio of executive to non-executive board members: 
 
A good corporate governance measure is to have at least 1/2 non-executive members on the 
board (Higgs Report, 2003). This is mainly to ensure that non-executives can play a fiduciary 
role  and  enforce  a  balance  on  the  board.  It  can  happen  that  because  the  ‘family’  is  the 
strongest controlling shareholder and also possess a presence on the board, the management 
(non-family executives), who’s tenure may depend largely on the goodwill of the ‘family’, ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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may tend to go along with the ideas of the family executives. It is then the responsibility of 
the non-executive members to ensure that the right decisions are taken for the company free 
from family aspiration. Therefore the firms where given a score of 1 if the ratio between their 
executives and non-executives was equal to or above the 1/2 mark. However we found that an 
examination into the relationship between board size and performance for the matched sample 
of non-family firms revealed contrary results. Firms where the board ratio was ½ or more 
actually performed worse. Therefore we take a reverse scoring method for non-family firms. 
The anomaly may be because these firms are smaller in size (as the family firms are smaller in 
size) and need more technical support than monitoring.  
 
No other family members on the board: 
 
The hold of a family will depend on the number of family members on the firm. Keeping in 
mind that this index is mainly to assist investors in understanding the value of a particular 
company as an investment, therefore it is important for investors to see independence on the 
board. The presence of family members on the board could be counter-productive for various 
reasons. Anderson and Reeb (2003) while studying the reasons for founding family public 
firms to outperform those firms with dispersed ownership show that it is mainly because of 
the influence of independent directors who mitigate any shareholder-shareholder conflict that 
can  arise  because  of  family  concentrated  ownership.  This  helps  in  limiting  family 
opportunism and investors in the US highly depend on the influence of independent directors 
that help to counterbalance family influence. Therefore a score of 1 is given when there is 
only 1 family member present on the board. 
 
Not Present on Remuneration Committee: 
 
One of the most contested topics in governance is the compensation that executives get these 
days.  The  sheer  rise  in  ‘wages’  seems  disproportional  to  the  advancements  made  in  a 
business.  The  argument  always  is  that  executives  who  are  talented  need  to  be  paid 
proportional to the development of the business to reflect their contribution. However from a 
family firm point of view, where we have family in management as well as a shareholder, it is 
vital to control the compensation that executives receive simply because this can be a form of 
pecuniary benefits extortion. Minority shareholders may not be able to protest, as the family ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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members are also present as shareholders. Therefore in a family firm we must ensure that 
non-family members are present on the Remuneration Committee. This will instil confidence 
that the family directors are receiving fair compensation. Therefore a score of 1 is given when 
the family member is not present on the Remuneration Committee. We find that when an 
executive director  is not  present on  the Remuneration Committee  the  performance  of the 
company  suffers.  These  non-family  firms  are  smaller  than  usual  and  the  non-executive 
directors are not equipped to understand the intricacies of the business. This might mean that 
executives  are  therefore  not  compensated  commensurate  with  their  technical-management 
expertise. So we need to reverse the scoring for non-family firms 
 
Net Gearing ratio: 
 
Fama (1980) and Jensen (1986) argue that managers tend to protect their undiversified wealth 
(which includes their human and intellectual capital investments as well) and try to reduce the 
pressures on the cash flow of the firm and thus want to limit the use of debt. However, family 
firms may be tempted to increase leverage to inflate the voting power of their concentrated 
ownership (Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988)). But again as this index is from the 
point of view of investors, lower debt-equity ratios are favourable as this will mean that 
equity holders as residual claimants have a stronger chance of recovering their investments in 
the event of bankruptcy. The ratio was calculated as follows  
 
NGR= {(Total Borrowings – Cash)/ Shareholder funds} x 100 
 
The sector averages are obtained and the firms are given a score of 1 if the Net Gearing ratio 




Dividend policy of a firm acts as a strong signalling instrument but it can have a two-fold 
impact. Higher dividends signal to market that the firm may have tapped into its resources and 
is  achieving  more  profits  than  its  competitors  thus  signalling  that  a  dividend  payout  is 
associated with better firm value. However, the other viewpoint is that a dividend payout 
symbolizes  that  the  management  is  having  difficulties  in  finding  better  investment ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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opportunities, which in turn can ensure future cash flows (Ross, 1977). Thus it can have a 
negative impact on share price as well. The dividend yield, which is a ratio between dividend 
payouts and share price, is a good device to see whether the investors suffer short-termism or 
are  interested  in long-term  profits.    Firms  that possess  growth  prospects  will  have  lower 
dividend yields and considering that reputation of a firm is built over a long period of time 
then we can say that lower a firms dividend yield the better is its reputation. We often find 
that zero-dividend payout firms (growth firms) are lucrative firms if they have higher returns 
and that investors would prefer to reinvest their cash back into these firms.  The calculation of 
the dividend yield is as follows 
 
D/Y = {Dividend (total dividend per share for the last financial year)/ Last closing share 
price} x 100 
 
Again the sector averages where obtained and scores of 1 were given to D/Y values less than 
the sector average.  
However, for non-family firms the reverse adds more value to a firm. When D/Y is above 
sector averages they get better performances. For family firms giving dividends would be 
interpreted as a move to ‘line their own pockets’. However, with smaller non-family firms the 
type of clientele may require a payment of dividends to suffice their shareholders. So the 
scoring has been reversed for non-family firms. 
 
Institutional share ownership: 
 
The presence of institutional shareowners can have an impact on firm especially when they 
are family firms with concentrated share ownership. This instils immense confidence among 
shareholders.  As  institutional  investors  need  to protect  their  investments  not  only  for  the 
continued  success  of  their  establishment  but  also  for  the  welfare  of  their  own  investors. 
Therefore the presence of institutional shareholders has always had a positive impact on the 
board of directors. The Institutional Shareholder Committee (ISC) had recommended higher 
levels of shareholder activism with special emphasis on institutional investors to exercise their 
vote and even sometimes to influence the board by placing their representatives. This is a very 
common feature that gives confidence to minority shareholders who can rely on the fiduciary 
control exercised by such board directors. Often the problem for minority shareholders with ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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very small shares in a company is that they do not have enough of a say or even the resources 
to prevent corporate decisions that affect shareholder value. This gives them the opportunity 
to  ride  on  the  institution’s  coat  tails  and  protect  their  investments  without  much  effort. 




All investor prefer firms that perform well and are profitable. However, investors are also 
risk-averse and would require higher levels of return for firms possessing higher risk. Thus 
the greater a firms ‘accounting risk’, the worse it is for investors. The measure of firm risk 
that has been adopted is the coefficient of variation (CV). 
CV= Average of the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of ROIC over 3 years 
Where, ROIC is the Return on Invested Capital, which is a measure often used to calculate the 
economic performance of a company. 
The approach used to identify scores for the company is a method used before as well. The 
firms in the portfolio are ranked. As greater ‘CV’ represents greater accounting risk in the 
company, therefore the bottom half of the portfolio is awarded 1 point. 
 
Market Risk and Performance: 
 
High performance and low risk convey information to the capital market on the soundness of 
future strategic decisions of the firm. Optimistic projections can even lead investors on to buy 
the equity of such firms, increasing their market value and thereby signalling to the market 
that they have the capability to deliver on their objectives. Returns and risk help the investors 
gain firm-specific and comparative information. Thus the greater a firms ‘market performance 
adjusted return’, the better it is for investors. The measure used for market risk is their ‘beta’ 
values. Beta is widely used market risk measure in finance simply because it is a measure of 
the systematic risk of a firm (the changes in the value of a firm’s stock accounted by general 
stock market movements). However, we use a Treynor ratio (i.e. (market return - risk-free 
return)/ beta of firm) to evaluate this provision. The portfolio is ranked and the top half (i.e. 
higher Treynor ratios are better) of the ranked firms are given a score of 1. 
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Use of Corporate resources: 
 
The  effective  use  of  corporate  assets  can  greatly  enhance  a  firm’s  performance  and 
profitability. The firms efficient use of assets can be accurately measured using the Return on 
Capital Expenditure (ROCE) and the Operating Margin (OP).  
 
ROCE= {(Normalised Pre Tax Profit + Interest paid) / Capital employed} x 100 
 
This shows the profit that a company is receiving for the amount of funds it invests. This ratio 
is important for investment purposes, as it will help determine the efficiency with which 
investments are being made. Low ratios symbolize low returns and as such a business could 
have problems servicing its investment borrowings. The Operating margin is calculated as 
follows 
 
OP= (Trading profits/Turnover) x 100 
 
This  shows  us  the  margin  on  profitability  on  sales  from  operating  activities  (it  excludes 
financial and investing activities). Use of this ratio helps us to isolate the effect on profit that 
only the core business of the firm has. For both the ratio mentioned above higher vales will be 
better for the firm. 
The analysis of ratios is always tricky because higher ratios do not always mean the business 
is  sound.  Only  by  comparing  them  to  sector  averages  can  we  make  sound  judgments. 
Therefore we give the firm a score of 1 when the ROCE and OP are higher than their sectoral 
averages. 
 
Quality of management: 
 
This may seem to be a qualitative aspect but the fact remains that more and more companies 
tend to recruit professional managers. However the definition of a professional manager is 
precarious and also the comparison of one set of board directors to the other can also be quite 
difficult.  The  Higgs  Report  (2003)  mentions  that  the  chairman  of  the  company  should 
encourage their executive directors to take on the role of non-executive officers in other firms. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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This is largely due to the fact that this increases the experience of directors. At the same time 
there should be limits to the amount of non-executive jobs they take up simply because these 
may prove to be a distraction from their main duties as an executive director. Also executive 
directors serving as non-executive’s on other boards, signals to the market that they possess 
necessary skills to be lucrative to other firms as well. 
The other aspect is that the non-executive directors for any firm should also hold similar 
positions in other firms so that they are fairly independent from the firm in question. The 
‘Enron  Case’  has  highlighted  the  problems  associated  with  dependence  of  non-executive 
directors on the firm. The non-executives of a firm need to disassociate their personal interest 
in the firm’s profitability from their corporate governance responsibilities.  
Therefore in my index I take two separate measures for assessing the quality of management. 
The first one is from the point of view of executive directors. If half or more than half of the 
executive directors in a company are also non-executive directors in other companies then 
they get a score of 1. The second is for the non-executive directors. If more than half of the 
firm’s non-executives are present on the boards of other listed firms then the firm gets a score 
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Family firm score on the each provision of the Investment Reputation Index 
 
Investment Reputation Index Provisions  Percentage of Family firms scoring 
on a particular Index provision 
   
Founder present  60.6 
Multi-Founder present  14.64 
No Family present on board  59.8 
Herfindalh Index  49.75 
Cubbin-Leech Alpha Index  49.75 
Long-term presence   70.9 
Executive present on remuneration committee   71.2 
Board ratio <= ½   36.68 
Institutional investor present  80.4 
Accounting Risk  49.75 
Market performance adjusted risk  50.25 
Quality of executive management  41.7 
Quality of non-executive management  30.15 
Dividend Yield  79.29 
Return on Capital Expenditure  34.17 
Operating Margin  45.23 
Net Gearing Ratio  72.22 
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Appendix 2 (contd.) - 
 
Non-family firm score on the each provision of the Investment Reputation Index 
 
Investment Reputation Index Provisions  Percentage  of  Non-Family  firms 
scoring  on  a  particular  Index 
provision 
   
Executive present on remuneration committee 
* 
24.34 
Board ratio <= 1/2 *   8.55 
Institutional investor present  84.86 
Accounting Risk  50 
Market performance adjusted risk  50 
Quality of executive management  42.11 
Quality of non-executive management  38.16 
Dividend Yield*  22.37 
Return on Capital Expenditure  25.65 
Operating Margin  44.74 
Net Gearing Ratio  67.76 
   
  
Note:  ‘*’ represents provisions that behave differently for non-family firms when compared to family firms for the year 
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Sample distribution of Family Firm Shareholding 
 
  N  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum 
           
Family Shareholding   199  33.2  29.77  98.25  3.08 
           
>= 50%  39  63.11  57.87  98.25  50.83 
>= 25%  118  45.5  42.36  98.25  25.29 
>= 10%  181  35.63  30.94  98.25  10.15 
<= 10%  18  6.74  6.79  9.89  3.08 
Founder Firms  91  32.57  29.37  98.25  5.24 
Two Founder Firms  29  34.46  30.2  69.1  11.45 

















Difference  between  joint  management 
shareholding and family shareholding   9.44  8.05  34.28  0.39 
Family  dominant  firm  Index  score 
(N=172)  8  9  15  3 
Management  dominant  firm  Index  score 
(N=27)  10.15  11  13  5 
         
 
Note:  The  Investment  Reputation  Index  measured  here  is  the  complete  index  with  all  the  familial  provisions  (i.e.  17 
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Sector distribution of family firms  
 
 
SECTOR BREAK-UP OF FAMILY FIRMS 
 
NO. OF FAMILY FIRMS 
   
AUTOMOBILES & PARTS  5 
BEVERAGES  2 
CONSTRUCTION & BUILDING MATERIALS  11 
DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIALS  1 
ELECTRONIC & ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT  4 
ENGINEERING & MACHINERY  8 
FOOD & DRUG RETAILER  3 
FOOD PRODUCERS & PROCESSORS  2 
FORESTRY & PAPER  1 
GENERAL RETAILER  16 
HEALTH  3 
HOUSEHOLD GOODS & TEXTILES  15 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY HARDWARE  7 
INSURANCE  3 
LEISURE & HOTEL  11 
MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT  11 
MINING  1 
OIL & GAS  6 
PHARMACEUTICAL & BIOTECHNOLOGY  1 
REAL ESTATE  23 
SOFTWARE & COMPUTER SERVICES  28 
SPECIALITY & OTHER FINANCE  11 
STEEL & OTHER METALS  1 
SUPPORT SERVICES  21 
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES  1 
TRANSPORT  3 
TOTAL  199 
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Sample distribution of the Investment Reputation Index for  
Family firms  
 




   
MINIMUM  3 
MEAN  8.95 
MEDIAN  9 
MODE   9 
MAXIMUM  15 
STANDARD DEVIATION  2.68 
   
NO. OF FAMILY FIRMS WITH   
I <= 5  21 
I  =  6  18 
I  =  7  22 
I  =  8  23 
I  =  9  31 
I  = 10  25 
I  = 11  19 
I  = 12  21 
I  = 13  12 
I  = 14  6 
I  = 15  1 
   
TOTAL  199 
   
 
1 The measurement of the Investment Reputation index is detailed in Section 3. The index here refers to the complete family 
firm index which includes all the family factors (i.e. 17 provisions) ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-15 
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Distribution of Investment Reputation Index
1 scores for various types of family firms (N=199) 
 
  N  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum 
           
Founder Firm   91  9.79  10  14  5 
Two Founder Firm   29  11  12  15  6 
Not more than 1 family 
member  
119  10.17  10  15  6 
More  than  1  family 
member  
80  7.14  7  13  3 
           
 
1 The measurement of the Investment Reputation index is detailed in Section 3. The index here refers to the complete family 





Index break up of the Investment Reputation Index
1 score for Family firms (N=199) 
 
  FTSE  AIM  FLEDGLING 
MEAN  9.79  8.95  8.21 
MEDIAN  10  9  8 
MODE  10  9  9 
MAX  14  15  13 
MIN  6  3  3 
RANGE  8  12  10 
ST DEV  2.13  2.87  2.66 
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1 The measurement of the Investment Reputation index is detailed in Section 3. The index here refers to the complete family 
firm index which includes all the family factors (i.e. 17 provisions) 
Table VIII 
 
Sample distribution of the Investment Reputation Index for  
Non-family firms 
 
INVESTMENT REPUTATION INDEX (I)
1  2003-2004 
   
MINIMUM  2 
MEAN  4.84 
MEDIAN  5 
MODE   4
a 
MAXIMUM  8 
STANDARD DEVIATION  1.56 
   
NO.  OF  NON-  FAMILY  MATCHED 
FIRMS WITH 
 
I  = 2  8 
I  = 3  27 
I  = 4  32 
I  = 5  29 
I  = 6  32 
I  = 7  18 
I  = 8  6 
   
TOTAL  152 
   
 
Note: 
1 The measurement  and construction of the Investment Reputation Index are detailed in Section 3. The index accounts for all 
the non-familial factors which may represent the reputation of any non-family firms (i.e. 11 provisions) 
 
a Multiple modes exist. The smallest one is shown above.  
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1 scores for matched sample based on the same provisions 
 
 
Panel A: Index break up of the Investment Reputation Index score  
for matched non-family firms (N=152) 
 
  FTSE  AIM  FLEDGLING 
MEAN  4.74  5.05  4.61 
MEDIAN  5  5  4 
MODE  3  6  3 
MAXIMUM  8  8  8 
MINIMUM  2  2  2 
RANGE  6  6  6 
ST. DEVIATION  1.60  1.57  1.46 
 
 
Panel B: Index break up of the Investment Reputation Index
1 scores  
for matched family firms (N=152) 
 
  FTSE  AIM  FLEDGLING 
MEAN  6.32  6.12  5.53 
MEDIAN  6  6  6 
MODE  6  6  6 
MAXIMUM  11  10  9 
MINIMUM  3  2  2 
RANGE  6  6  6 
ST. DEVIATION  1.63  1.88  1.79 
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Note: 
1 The Investment Reputation Index used in the Table IX (Panel A and Panel B) are based on the same provisions of the 




This table reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of Family firms (N=199) . The firm performance measure, 
Q, is taken as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets: the market value of assets is measured 
by the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock less the book value of common stock and 
deferred taxes.  ‘Index’ represents the Investment Reputation Index score of a family firm taking all 17 provisions. 
‘Index1’ represents the Investment Reputation Index score of family firms without taking the 6 familial provisions, 
i.e. a total of 11 non-family firm specific factors. We include control variables – Age is represented here as the number 
of years a firm has been listed. FTSE equals one when a firm is listed on the FTSE All Share. Size is the natural 
logarithm of Total Assets of a firm. Growth is the sales growth of a firm over the previous three years. R&D is taken as 
the (Research & Development expenses/ Total Sales). CAPEX is taken as (Capital Expenditure/Total Assets). Leverage 
is measured by taking (Long Term Debt/ Total Assets).  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Family firms (N=199) 
 
  MINIMUM  MAXIMUM  MEAN  STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
         
Q  -1.85  7.08  1.83  1.03 
INDEX1  3  15  8.95  2.68 
INDEX2  2  11  5.9  1.79 
SIZE  3.91  15.46  10.51  1.79 
GROWTH  -1  7.65  0.09  0.69 
CAPITAL 
EXPENDITURE 
0  2.48  0.07  0.2 
R & D  0  1.16  0.03  0.13 
LEVERAGE  0  0.96  0.11  0.16 
AGE  4  104  15.97  15.06 
INCLUSION  IN 
FTSE  
0  1  0.28  0.45 
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Panel B: Correlation Matrix for Family firm (N=199) 
   
VARIABLES  Q  INDEX  SIZE  GROWTH  CAPEX  R&D  LEVERAGE  AGE  FTSE 
Q  1.000                 
INDEX1  0.185  1.000               
SIZE  -.199  0.041  1.000             
GROWTH  -.014  0.106  0.133  1.000           
CAPEX  0.243  -.128  -.138  -.015  1.000         
R&D  0.064  0.143  -.249  -.132  -.055  1.000       
LEVERAGE  -.071  -.033  0.389  -.052  0.095  -.066  1.000     
AGE  -.128  -.291  0.235  -.074  -.054  -.137  0.032  1.000   
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This table reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of Family firms (N=199) . The firm performance measure, 
Q, is taken as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets: the market value of assets is measured 
by the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock less the book value of common stock and 
deferred taxes.  ‘Index 1’ represents the Investment Reputation Index score of a matched sample of family and non-
family firms taking all the non-family specific provisions into account i.e. 11 provisions. ‘Index 2’ represents the 
Investment Reputation Index score for a family firm taking the 6 familial provisions, i.e. a total of 17 and then taking 
this score as a proportion of 17. For a non-family firm we take the Investment Reputation Index score for all the non-
family specific factors, i.e. 11 provisions and then this score proportioned by 11. We include control variables – Age is 
represented here as the number of years a firm has been listed. FTSE equals one when a firm is listed on the FTSE All 
Share. Size is the natural logarithm of Total Assets of a firm. Growth is the sales growth of a firm over the previous 
three years.  R&D  is taken as the (Research  &  Development  expenses/  Total  Sales).  CAPEX is taken  as (Capital 




PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics for Matched Sample (N=304) 









         
Q  -0.362  8.69  1.76  0.94 
INDEX3  2  11  5.44  1.78 
INDEX4  0.177  0.882  0.489  0.157 
SIZE  6.08  15.46  10.61  1.81 
GROWTH  -1  126.8  0.64  7.49 
CAPITAL 
EXPENDITURE 
0  1.038  0.05  0.78 
R & D  0  17.4  0.09  1.004 
LEVERAGE  0  1.59  0.13  0.19 
AGE  3  104  13.76  14.29 
INCLUSION  IN 
FTSE  
0  1  0.33  0.469 
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Table XI (contd.) 
  
Panel  B  and  C  of  this  table  reports  the  sample  characteristics  of  the  matched  family  and  non-family  firms 
respectively. INDEX1 presents the Investment Reputation Index score for firms by taking the total of their scores on 
all the non-family specific provisions (i.e. 11 provisions). INDEX2 presents the Investment Reputation Index score for 
the  family firms by taking all the familial provisions as well and then as a proportion of 17. For the non-family firms 
it  is  measured  by  taking  the  total  score  on  the  non-family  specific  index  provisions  as  a  proportion  of  11.  Age 
represents the total number of years that the firm has been listed. FTSE represents a dummy variable with value 1 if a 
firm is included in the FTSE All Share. Size is the natural logarithm of Total Assets of a firm. Growth is the sales 
growth of a firm over the previous three years. R&D is taken as the (Research & Development expenses/ Total Sales). 
CAPEX is taken as (Capital Expenditure/Total Assets). Leverage is measured by taking (Long Term Debt/ Total 
Assets). Panel D presents the Mean Difference significance test and presents the t-statistics and the Wilcoxon Ranked 
Sign Test. 
 
Sample characteristics of matched family Firm Vs. matched non-family firm 
 
PANEL B: Sample Characteristics 
 
FAMILY (MATCHED SAMPLE) N=152 
VARIABLE  INDEX3  INDEX4  AGE  FTSE  SIZE  GROWTH  CAPEX  R&D  LEV 
MEAN  6.03  0.54  15.2  0.34  10.64  0.128  0.056  0.02  0.114 
MEDIAN  6.00  0.529  11.00  0.00  10.59  0.05  0.029  0.000  0.038 
MINIMUM  2  0.1765  4  0  6.08  -1.00   0.000  0.000  0.000 
MAXIMUM  11  0.8824  104  1  15.46  7.65  1.038  0.352  0.602 
SAMPLE 
SIZE 
152  152  152  152  152  152  152  152  152 
 
 
PANEL C: Sample Characteristics 
 
NON-FAMILY (MATCHED SAMPLE) N=152 
VARIABLE  INDEX3  INDEX4  AGE  FTSE  SIZE  GROWTH  CAPEX  R&D  LEV 
MEAN  4.84  0.44  12.31  0.34  10.58  1.152  0.043  0.169  0.141 
MEDIAN  5.00  0.455  7  0.00  10.54  0.018  0.025  0.000  0.031 
MINIMUM  2  0.182  3  0.00  6.57  -1.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
MAXIMUM  8  0.727  69  1.00  15.41  126.83  0.263  17.135  1.599 
SAMPLE 
SIZE 
152  152  152  152  152  152  152  152  152 
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PANEL D: SIGNIFICANCE TEST FOR MEAN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NON-FAMILY & FAMILY FIRMS  
















t-statistics  6.219*** 
 




0.000***  0.000***  0.001***  0.928  0.841  0.135  0.571  0.399 
 
*** - 1%  significance 
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This table reports the relationship between the investment reputation index (INDEX) and performance for the sample 
of family firms (N=199). The firm performance measure, Q, is taken as the ratio of the market value of assets to the 
book value of assets: the market value of assets is measured by the sum of the book value of assets and the market 
value of common stock less the book value of common stock and deferred taxes. The measurement and specifics of the 
INDEX are provided in Section 5.1. We include control variables – Age is taken as the natural logarithm of the 
number of years a firm has been listed. FTSE equals one when a firm is listed on the FTSE All Share. Size is the 
natural logarithm of Total Assets of a firm. Growth is the sales growth of a firm over the previous three years. R&D is 
taken as the (Research & Development expenses/ Total Sales). CAPEX is taken as (Capital Expenditure/Total Assets). 
Leverage is measured by taking (Long Term Debt/ Total Assets). All the estimates are either Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS)  estimates  with  White’s  Heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard  errors  and  Weighted  Least  Square  (WLS) 
regressions using CAPEX as the weight estimate. The significance of each coefficient is indicated. The t-statistics are 

















CONSTANT  3.060***  1.841***  3.202***     2.087*** 
INDEX  0.075***          0.162***  0.105***     0.260*** 
AGE     0.052  0.371***     0.017     0.298*** 
FTSE  0.637***          0.483***  0.685***     0.616*** 
SIZE  -0.216**         -0.222***    -0.217**    -0.245*** 
GROWTH    -0.014          0.015    -0.021        -0.091 
CAPEX  1.076***  1.430***  1.048***      1.328*** 
R & D    -0.143        -4.405**    -0.169  -4.394**  
LEVERAGE    -0.025        -2.204***     0.0192     -1.473*** 
 
(1)  Ordinary Least Square estimates corrected for heteroskedasticity using White heteroskedaticity consistent standard errors 
and covariance matrix for the complete sample of family firms (N=199). The ‘Index’ variable represents the investment 
reputation index with the familial characteristics (i.e. 11 provisions)  
(2)  Weighted Least Square estimates using CAPEX as weights for the complete sample of family firms (N=199). The 
‘Index’ variable represents the investment reputation index with the familial characteristics (i.e. 17 provisions) 
(3)  Ordinary Least Square estimates corrected for heteroskedasticity using White heteroskedaticity consistent standard errors 
and covariance matrix for the complete sample of family firms (N=199). The ‘Index’ variable represents the investment 
reputation index without the familial characteristics (i.e. 11 provisions) 
(4) Weighted Least Square estimates using CAPEX as weights for complete sample of family firms (N=199). The ‘Index’ 
variable represents the investment reputation index without the familial characteristics (i.e. 11 provisions) 
 
 
*** - 1%  significance 
**   -5%   significance 
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This table reports the relationship between the investment reputation index (INDEX) and performance for the matched 
sample of non-family firms (N=152). The firm performance measure, Q, is taken as the ratio of the market value of 
assets to the book value of assets: the market value of assets is measured by the sum of the book value of assets and the 
market value of common stock less the book value of common stock and deferred  taxes. The measurement and 
specifics of the  INDEX  are  provided  in  Section  5.2.  We  include  control  variables  –  Age  is  taken  as the  natural 
logarithm of the number of years a firm has been listed. FTSE equals one when a firm is listed on the FTSE All Share. 
Size is the natural logarithm of Total Assets of a firm. Growth is the sales growth of a firm over the previous three 
years.  R&D  is  taken  as  the  (Research  &  Development  expenses/  Total  Sales).  CAPEX  is  taken  as  (Capital 
Expenditure/Total Assets). Leverage is measured by taking (Long Term Debt/ Total Assets). All the estimates are 
either  Ordinary  Least  Square  (OLS)  estimates  with  White’s  Heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard  errors  and 
Weighted Least Square (WLS) regressions using R&D as the weight estimate. The significance of each coefficient is 
















CONSTANT  2.575***  -1.148  2.575***  -1.485 
INDEX  0.175***          0.378***  1.935***         4.164*** 
AGE    -0.091          0.866***  -0.091         0.866*** 
FTSE    0.614**          3.742***        0.614**         3.742*** 
SIZE  -0.172**    0.081      -0.172**   0.080 
GROWTH    -0.001            -7.276***  -0.001        -7.276*** 
CAPEX     3.050         -33.45***   3.050  -33.452*** 
R & D    0.056**     0.006        0.056**           0.005 
LEVERAGE    -0.325        -0.66***  -0.325  -0.660 
 
(1)  Ordinary Least Square estimates corrected for heteroskedasticity using White heteroskedaticity consistent standard errors 
and  covariance matrix    for  the  matched  sample  of  non-family  firms  (N=152). The ‘Index’  variable  represents  the 
investment reputation index without the familial characteristics (i.e. 11 provisions) 
(2)  Weighted Least Square estimates using R&D as weights for matched sample of non-family firms (N=152). The ‘Index’ 
variable represents the investment reputation index without the familial characteristics (i.e. 11 provisions) 
(3)   Ordinary Least Square estimates corrected for heteroskedasticity using White heteroskedaticity consistent standard 
errors and covariance matrix  for the matched sample of non-family firms (N=152). The ‘Index’ variable represents the 
investment reputation index without the familial characteristics and then presented as a ratio of the total highest score 
possible i.e. 11. For example a firm scoring 9 would be given a value of 0.818 (i.e. 9/11) in this index. 
(4)  Weighted Least Square estimates using R&D as weights for matched sample of non-family firms (N=152). The    ‘Index’ 
variable represents the investment reputation index without the familial characteristics and then presented as a ratio of 
the highest total score possible i.e. 11. For example a firm scoring 9 would be given a value of 0.818 (i.e. 9/11) in this 
index. 
 
*** - 1%  significance 
**   -5%   significance 
*     -10% significance 
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This table reports the results of regressing firm performance measure, Q, on the investment reputation index for a 
matched sample of firms (N=304). Q is taken as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets: the 
market value of assets is measured by the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock less 
the book value of common stock and deferred taxes. The Investment Reputation index (INDEX) is measured as per 
specification in Section 5.3. We include control variables – Age is taken as the natural logarithm of the number of 
years a firm has been listed. FTSE equals one when a firm is listed on the FTSE All Share. Size is the natural 
logarithm of Total Assets of a firm. Growth is the sales growth of a firm over the previous three years. R&D is taken as 
the (Research & Development expenses/ Total Sales). CAPEX is taken as (Capital Expenditure/Total Assets). Leverage 
is measured by taking (Long Term Debt/ Total Assets). We add a Family Firm Dummy Variable, FF DUM, which is 
one for a family firm. Slope differentials for the Investment Reputation index, INDEX, and the control variables are 
added in the regression. This is obtained by multiplying each of the above-mentioned variables with the FF DUM 
variable. These slope differentials will identify any specific differences between the matched sample of family and 
non-family firms. All the coefficients presented below are from Weighted Least Square (WLS) regressions using R&D 











CONSTANT  -1.467  -1.471 
FF DUM  3.278    1.439 
INDEX         0.381***         4.185***  
AGE         0.882***          0.879*** 
FTSE          3.758***          3.755*** 
SIZE  0.073    0.074 
GROWTH       -7.274***         -7.274*** 
CAPEX      -33.169***       -33.225*** 
R&D   0.005    0.005 
LEVERAGE       -0.656***         -0.657*** 
INDEX DUM   -0.258*  -2.382 
AGE DUM  0.010   0.001 
FTSE DUM     -2.139**        -2.632*** 
SIZE DUM                 -0.391                 -0.231 
GROWTH DUM        6.257***         6.428*** 
CAPEX DUM                19.081  22.051 
R&D DUM  2.176    3.118 
LEVERAGE DUM  4.530    3.751 
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 (1) Weighted Least Square estimates using R & D as weights for a matched sample of family and non-family firms 
(N=304). The ‘Index’ variable represents the investment reputation index without the familial provisions (i.e. 11 index 
provisions). This means that the index measures the exact same provisions for both the matched family and non-family 
firms 
 (2) Weighted Least Square estimates using R & D as weights for a matched sample of family and non-family firms (N=304). 
The ‘Index’ variable for family firms is calculated by taking the total score of a family firm on all the provisions (i.e. 
including the familial provisions) as a proportion of the highest possible score (i.e. 17). For example a firm scoring 9 
would be given a value of 0.529 (i.e. 9/17) in this index. 
        The ‘Index’ variable for non-family firms is calculated by taking the total score of a non-family firm on all the non-
family specific factors (i.e. 11 provisions) as a proportion of the highest possible score for a firm on this index i.e. 11.  
For example a firm scoring 9 would be given a value of 0.818 (i.e. 9/11) in this index. 
 
*** - 1% significance 
**   -5%   significance 
*     -10% significance 
 
 
 